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FOR THE “DEALS” NO SHOPPER COULD
PASS UP: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
INTERPRETATION OF CALIFORNIA’S
FALSE ADVERTISING LAW IN
HINOJOS V. KOHL’S CORPORATION
Leslie E. Schuster
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, California voters approved an initiative to eliminate
private consumer standing under California’s False Advertising laws
(FAL) and Unfair Competition laws (UCL) in most cases.1 A broad
coalition of business interests supported the campaign for this
initiative, also known as Proposition 64 (“Prop. 64”).2 The pro–Prop.
64 campaign claimed that California’s legal system had run amok
because the consumer standing requirements encouraged “frivolous
lawsuits,” of which businesses were the victims.3 However, there
was little factual basis for this assertion, and the campaign glossed
over the countless meritorious lawsuits that consumers pursued in
order to address the financial and emotional injuries caused by

 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, April 2010. I would like to thank Professor Jennifer
Rothman for her guidance on this Comment and for always challenging me to do my best. Thank
you to the talented and dedicated staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Finally, thank
you to my family for their unending support and encouragement.
1. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2013); id. § 17200. The 2004 amendment to
section 17204 (which lays out the standing requirements to pursue claims under these statutes)
did not eliminate consumer standing entirely, but significantly narrowed the meaning of
“economic loss or injury,” as required to obtain standing. See infra Part IV. Under these
amendments, consumers could still sue as members of a class action or if a public official
initiated litigation on their behalf. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204.
2. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS, PROP. 64 (2004), available at
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2004/general/propositions/prop64text.pdf;
Yes
on
64
Californians to Stop Shakedown Lawsuits, FOLLOW THE MONEY, http://www.followthemoney
.org/database/StateGlance/committee.phtml?c=1219 (last visited Apr. 12, 2014) (featuring a table
of the proponents’ top twenty contributors).
3. See infra Part IV.
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deceptive business practices.4
In the ten years since Prop. 64’s passage, consumer protection
advocates have repeatedly expressed concern that the amended FAL
and UCL “significantly limit[] the ability of private individuals and
public interest groups to bring . . . consumer protection lawsuits
against suspected corporate wrongdoers.”5 As a matter of statutory
interpretation, the extent to which Prop. 64 limited or removed
private consumer standing was unclear.6 However, in Hinojos v.
Kohl’s Corp.,7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals quelled consumer
protection advocates’ fears with its interpretation of the Prop. 64
amendments.8 Hinojos involved a department store that allegedly
inflated “original” prices during “sales” to give the impression of a
bargain based on purported reductions.9 The Ninth Circuit held that
when a consumer alleges that he would not have made a purchase but
for the retailer’s misrepresentation of price, that consumer has
suffered an economic injury sufficient to meet the standing
requirement and state a claim under the FAL and UCL.10 This
holding broadened the requisite injury for consumer suits to a
4. See Gregory Klass, The Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100
GEO. L.J. 449, 450, 463 (2012) (discussing the presumption of emotional injury caused by
deception); see also Marc Lifsher, Lockyer Joins Prop. 64 Fray, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004,
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/01/business/fi-prop641 (discussing Prop. 64 supporters’ fears
that individuals were previously suing small businesses without having been directly harmed);
Fact Sheet: “Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse” Groups, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY,
http://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-citizens-against-lawsuit-abuse-groups (last visited Oct. 20,
2013) (“The CALA message is a sly deception designed to appeal broadly to patriotic, hardworking Americans, many of whom will ultimately serve on juries. At its core, the message
equates the efforts of injured consumers to recover damages from those responsible with ‘lawsuit
abuse.’”).
5. Lifsher, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Letter from Kriss
Worthington, Councilmember, City of Berkeley, Cal. to the Mayor and City Council (Oct. 12,
2004) (on file with the City of Berkeley) (“Limits individuals right to sue by allowing private
enforcement of unfair business competition laws only if that individual was actually injured by,
and suffered financial/property loss because of, an unfair business practice.”).
6. See Bruce A. Colbath, California Supreme Court Further Clarifies Standing
Requirements of the Unfair Competition Law, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 288, 290 (2011); see
also Sharon J. Arkin, The Unfair Competition Law after Proposition 64: Changing the Consumer
Protection Landscape, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 158 (2005) (“According to [Stop Youth
Addiction v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1090–91 (Cal. 1998)], the only reasonable
construction of the Unfair Competition Law is that its remedies are not available to private parties
if the Legislature did not include an express private right of action in the enforcement scheme for
the underlying law.”).
7. 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013).
8. See id. at 1104–05, 1107.
9. Id. at 1102.
10. Id. at 1107.
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materiality standard in false sales cases.11
Hinojos expands the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court,12 which concluded that material
misrepresentations as to origin and composition of consumer goods
purchased are sufficient injuries to establish standing for false
advertising claims against retailers.13 Now in Hinojos, with the
finding that “price advertisements matter,”14 the Ninth Circuit has
reopened the door to pre–Prop. 64 standards for consumers to
privately sue retailers who take advantage of consumers through
dishonest sales techniques.
This Comment asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s reading of
California statutes and California Supreme Court precedent balanced
traditional notions of injury for standing purposes with consumer
protection policy and, in so doing, advanced consumer rights in
California.15 Yet, while consumers’ right to sue has been affirmed in
California, at the federal level and among several other states,
statutes prohibiting false advertising and unfair competition still
primarily serve only competitive business interests.16 In most states,
false advertising and unfair competition statutes define economic
injury for standing purposes in terms of lost sales or harm to business
reputation.17 Applying this definition of economic injury means that
consumers generally lack standing to bring private actions against
retailers. This nearly exclusive focus on competitors leaves most
consumers unfairly cut off from the civil justice system.18
Part II examines the facts of Hinojos and considers the court’s
reasoning. Part III frames the importance of consumer protection law
by examining consumer behavior and the public policy principles
underlying the nationwide prohibition on false advertising. Part IV
reviews the statutory framework of California’s FAL and UCL—
11. Id.
12. 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011).
13. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1106–07.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1992) (stating that standing
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the federal cause of action for false advertising, is granted
exclusively to competitors).
17. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE
REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 3 (2009).
18. See infra Part III.B.
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under which the Ninth Circuit decided Hinojos—as well as the
political efforts to narrow consumer standing under those laws. Part
V then analyzes the significance of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
of the standing requirements by comparing them to those under the
federal false advertising statute19 and other states’ statutes. Part VI
concludes by predicting the ultimate outcome in Hinojos and its
impact on future unfair competition and false advertising cases, and
ultimately suggests that federal law adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
approach.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On May 6, 2010, Plaintiff Antonio Hinojos purchased hundreds
of dollars of apparel and luggage at Defendant Kohl’s Corporation’s
(“Kohl’s”) store in Glendora, California.20 Advertisements and instore labeling on several of the purchased items indicated discounts
of 32 to 50 percent off of their “original” prices.21 When Hinojos
learned that Kohl’s had heavily inflated the so-called “original”
prices and that these prices were never representative of the
prevailing market rates for the goods, he initiated litigation against
Kohl’s for false advertising and unfair competition in California
Superior Court.22 Kohl’s removed the case to federal court.23
Before the district court, Hinojos alleged that Kohl’s deceptive
sale prices were a material factor in his decision to buy the goods
from Kohl’s, as opposed to another retailer.24 He also cited
California statutes prohibiting retailers from representing sale prices
“as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the alleged former
price was the prevailing market price . . . within three months . . .
preceding the publication of the advertisement.”25 Hinojos further
argued that purchases made under false pretenses—as created by
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
20. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss at 3, Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV 10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013).
21. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-55793).
22. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1102.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17501 (West 2013); Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1102–03.
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Kohl’s advertisements and in-store signage—constituted “lost money
or property” for the purposes of standing under California’s False
Advertising Law and Unfair Competition Law.26 The district court
dismissed Hinojos’s complaint, holding that the alleged material
misrepresentations were inadequate to establish sufficient economic
injury to satisfy the standing requirement because Hinojos knew
Kohl’s offering price and accepted it.27 Hinojos therefore got what he
paid for.28 The district court also distinguished Hinojos from
Kwikset, holding that consumer standing did not apply when the
advertisement pertained to misleading price information, as opposed
to a product’s substantive qualities.29 Hinojos appealed to the Ninth
Circuit and successfully argued for reinstatement of his complaint.30
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s
interpretation of Kwikset.31 In Kwikset, the plaintiff, a buyer of
locksets advertised as “Made in U.S.A.,” sued the seller upon
learning that the locksets contained foreign parts and were partially
manufactured in Mexico.32 As in Hinojos, the complaint alleged
violations of the California Business and Professions Code (“Code”)
for advertising false information as to the origin and composition of
the goods in question.33 The trial and lower appellate courts
interpreted amendments to the Code as a broad limitation on private
consumer standing, except where the consumer suffered a
“sufficient” economic injury in the form of “lost money or property
as a result of the unfair competition.”34 Because the Kwikset buyer
did not allege that the price he paid for the locksets was excessive or
that the locksets themselves were defective, the lower courts found
deception to be the sole injury, and thus insufficient to establish
standing.35 The California Supreme Court reversed, finding that,
26. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1101–02.
27. Id. at 1105.
28. Id. at 1102.
29. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013).
30. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1103, 1108.
31. Id. at 1105.
32. Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 882 (Cal. 2011).
33. Id. at 881.
34. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2013).
35. Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 881.
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when deceptive sales techniques have a material effect on the
consumer’s decision to purchase, the money spent purchasing the
product in question may be deemed “lost” for the purposes of
satisfying the standing requirement.36
The district court in Hinojos narrowly construed the holding in
Kwikset to misrepresentations of production, composition, and
origin.37 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that “Kwikset
cannot be so easily limited.”38 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
consumers care not only about composition and origin of products,
but also pricing information regarding those products, including their
“original” price and the extent of an apparent discount or bargain
during a sale.39 In support of this proposition, the court cited
academic literature indicating that price statements convey valuable
“information about the product’s worth . . . and prestige.”40
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that a consumer who alleges a
false sale and purported “bargain” as material facts in his decision to
purchase the product in question has, in fact, been deceived in a
commercial setting; therefore, the money spent on the purchase
constitutes an economic injury sufficient to establish standing under
the FAL and UCL.41
The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s
conclusion that Hinojos lacked standing because he received the
benefit of the bargain.42 Under the district court’s view, Hinojos
lacked standing because he had known the offering price, made a
decision based on that price, and then kept the goods.43 The Ninth
Circuit noted, however, that a consumer only receives the benefit of
the bargain when he has full command of the facts that convince him

36. Id. at 891–92.
37. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV 10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013).
38. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1105 (9th Cir. 2013).
39. Id. at 1105–06.
40. Id. at 1106 (citing Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising:
Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 52, 55 (Spring 1992)).
41. The court bolstered its reasoning by citing academic literature that explained the
psychological effect that perceived deals have on most consumers. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1106
(citing Grewal & Compeau, supra note 40, at 56). Such literature helps explain why consumer
protection laws should be construed to the consumer’s benefit. See infra Part III.A.
42. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107.
43. Id.; Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV 10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at
*3–4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013).
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to make the purchase.44 Hinojos alleged that Kohl’s
misrepresentations of deep discounts were material to his decision to
purchase, as he apparently had lacked the full and complete
knowledge that would allow him to receive the benefit of the
bargain.45 The Ninth Circuit therefore found the complaint’s
allegation of materiality sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement
at the pleading stage.46
Drawing strongly on legislative intent and the public policies
underlying consumer protection law,47 the Ninth Circuit ultimately
expressed concern that the district court’s narrow interpretation of
the FAL, UCL, and Kwikset would “bring to an end private
consumer enforcement of bans” on false sales practices.48
Delineating Prop. 64’s stated intent of minimizing frivolous lawsuits
while still protecting the right of private individuals to sue when they
actually suffer from deceptive commercial practices,49 the court
firmly stated that “price advertisements matter.”50 For the
aforementioned reasons, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Hinojos
had standing to sue Kohl’s for false advertising and unfair
competition.51
III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the FAL and UCL’s
standing requirements balanced the concern for protecting consumer
rights with a faithful interpretation of the legislative intent behind
Prop. 64 and the plain text of the amendments.52 In applying a
materiality standard, the court signaled greater receptiveness to
consumer claims and a judicial commitment to consumer protection
against deceptive advertising—at least in California.53 Although the
holding is limited to California, the case may actually bear greater
significance nationally, especially when one considers the retraction
44. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 1109.
47. See infra Part III.A.
48. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 891
(Cal. 2011)).
49. PROP. 64 § 1(d).
50. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1107.
51. Id. at 1109.
52. See id. at 1104.
53. Id. at 1106–07.
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of consumer standing rights under federal and state laws over the
past two decades.54
The analysis begins with an explanation of the public policy
rationales underpinning consumer protection in order to home in on
why consumers deserve the right to redress deception in commercial
transactions (just as business competitors’ have a right to redress
unfair competition). The analysis then turns to the statutory
framework of California’s consumer protection law to demonstrate
the reasonableness of the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation.
A. Why Consumer Protection Laws Matter
and Why Consumers Should Have Standing
to Enforce Them
An understanding of why judicial action advancing consumer
protection is important requires an astute assessment of consumer
behavior and the effect that patently false or misleading information
has on consumers.
1. Consumer Behavior
Consumers love a deal. For many, the thrill of finding a good
deal is comparable to the feeling of accomplishment associated with
achieving a goal.55 Experiential evidence and empirical data show
that, when presented with a sale or confronted with strategic priceframing techniques, consumers are more likely to make a purchase,
even when the bottom line has the same, or even less, benefit to
54. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1375 (2011) (“Despite the breadth of the language in
the Lanham Act, which provides a cause of action to ‘any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged’ by a violation of section 43(a), courts have never given those words a
literal reading. . . . [C]ourts simply excluded consumers from the class the law protected, allowing
only competitors to sue.”); see also BeVier, supra note 16, at 16 (“The consumer . . . is almost
never the plaintiff in section 43(a) litigation. The plaintiff, rather, is usually the defendant’s
competitor.”); HOT COFFEE (HBO 2011) (“Businesses use a number of devices to keep the public
out of courts.”); Stephanie Mencimer, Consumer Protection’s Citizens United, MOTHER JONES
(Nov. 9, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/att-concepcion-chamber
-of-commerce (noting that in 2005, the Chamber of Commerce “succeeded in winning legislation
that makes it much harder to bring such cases in state courts”).
55. With millions of users and even more daily sales, the proliferation of flash sale websites
like Gilt and Groupon, which was the second fastest company ever to reach a one billion dollar
valuation (surpassed only by YouTube), attest to the consumers’ love of “steals and deals.”
Christopher Steiner, Meet the Fastest Growing Company Ever, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2010, 3:40
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0830/entrepreneurs-groupon-facebook-twitter-next-web
-phenom.html.
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consumers.56 A recent example of this occurrence may be observed
in JC Penney’s attempt to simplify pricing by eliminating sales and
promotions and instead advertise “everyday low prices.”57 Although
the price of merchandise remained stable, JC Penney’s sales declined
by 25 percent less than one year after implementing its sales plan, a
loss of several billion dollars.58 In 2006, Macy’s attempted a similar
plan to “retrain” customers away from the psychological game of
sales and discounts.59 However, for consumers, the “thrill of getting
a great deal, even if it’s an illusion,” was too great, and both
companies quickly abandoned their plans to stem the tide of
dramatically falling sales.60
Empirical studies show that “[t]he use of ambiguous and
potentially misleading jargon increases an advertisement’s
trustworthiness. . . . Such contextual effects can be particularly
salient when consumers pay less attention to the content validity and
focus more on the contextual cues.”61 Applying this notion to a false
sales context, a consumer is more susceptible to believe a misleading
price statement based on contextual cues, such as higher “original”
prices or a purportedly high discount rate when that consumer has
not obtained a complete set of information as to the prevailing
market price of a good, and accordingly cannot assess the “content
validity.”62 Given the widespread recognition of consumers’ love of
deals, manipulating that aspect of human nature—as retailers often
do—should be considered contrary to public policy.
Correspondingly, undercutting consumers’ ability to seek legal
redress for retailers’ deceptive practices implicitly allows such
practices to continue and should likewise be viewed as contrary to
public policy.

56. Stephanie Clifford & Catherine Rampell, Sometimes, We Want Prices to Fool Us, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at BU1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (“Penney recognized that human trait and backtracked on its pricing policy, offering
coupons and running weekly sales again . . . . But here’s the thing: customers weren’t actually
paying less.”).
60. Id.
61. Guang-Xin Xie & David M. Bousch, How Susceptible Are Consumers to Deceptive
Advertising Claims? A Retrospective Look at the Experimental Research Literature, 11 MKTG.
REV. 293, 302 (2011).
62. Id.
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2. Public Policy and the Goals
of False Advertising Laws
Evidence shows that consumers make purchasing decisions
based on symbols such as brand names and advertisements.
Accordingly, laws prohibiting the misleading use of symbols and
trade information recognize the “commercial magnetism” of such
symbols.63 A broadly accepted economic principle states that “[a]
perfect market demands perfect enlightenment by those who buy and
sell.”64 Such enlightenment may be effectively achieved through
consumer protection. Fundamentally, consumer protection law
encourages consumers to make choices freely and confidently in the
marketplace,65 ensuring the market’s continued strength66 for the
benefit of consumers and competitors alike.67
Given consumers’ reliance on advertising from sellers,68
ensuring truth in advertising is of critical importance in fulfilling the
“perfect enlightenment” precept. Advertisements, however, are
inherently a mix of persuasion and information, often heavily
weighted toward persuasion.69 Accordingly, from an “above the
trees” perspective, unfair competition and false advertising laws
recognize the effect that commercial deception can have on
consumers and seek to protect businesses and individuals alike from
63. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
This case specifically pertains to trademarks, but the sentiment is equally applicable in the false
advertising context. Arguably, relative price has as much commercial magnetism as brand
symbols.
64. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168–69 (1948); see also BeVier, supra note 16, at 5 (“Under
conditions of perfect competition, there is no advertising because consumers are assumed to be
endowed at the outset with perfect information and thus have no need for it. In the imperfect real
world though, consumers have imperfect knowledge.”).
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a (1995).
66. Richard F. Dole, Jr., Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485, 506 (1967); see also Michael R. Baye, Director, Bureau of
Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at Bentley College: The Economics of Consumer Protection,
Antitrust, and Policy 23 (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov
/speeches/baye/080424bentley.pdf) (“For competition to thrive consumers must receive accurate
information about products and services.”).
67. Baye, supra note 66, at 4, 24.
68. See Brown, supra note 64, at 1168.
69. Id. at 1169; see also Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 115 (2012) (quoting SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION
GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS MARKET 27 (1989)) (“Marketing is
designed not merely to give information about products consumers already know they want but to
‘make people want many other things’ . . . . In the false advertising context, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has candidly acknowledged this persuasive function.”).
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the consequences of such deception.70 More narrowly, a Federal
Trade Commission survey reflects how vulnerable consumers are in
terms of likelihood of suffering from deception in commercial
transactions.71 The survey discloses that more than thirty million
American adults report being victims of fraud in commercial
contexts.72 While the survey concerns consumer fraud nationally,
state legislatures are empowered to address this problem and protect
consumers from misinformed decision making, and to rectify the
consequences of consumer fraud.
The Ninth Circuit also explained the importance of consumer
protection from false advertising. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
remarked that a “deceived bargain hunter [obviously] suffers” when
his expectations and the realities of economic value are misaligned.73
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s dual stress on the deception and its
connected injury recognizes precisely why protecting consumers
from deceptive trade practices is an important role the judiciary
should play. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis highlights how consumers
shopping in California are affected by violations of California’s UCL
and FAL. The analysis further emphasizes why—when their injury is
so obvious—consumers should be able to seek redress from sellers
who engage in practices that are dishonest and contrary to public
values.74
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Balanced Reading of
California’s Unfair Competition and
False Advertising Laws
With the realities of consumer behavior and the policy of
protecting consumers in mind, the Ninth Circuit set out to interpret
the statutory standing requirements at issue in Hinojos fairly and

70. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)
(discussing that the impact of symbols on consumers as a basis for prohibitions on false
advertising and deceptive use of trademarks); see also Brown, supra note 64, at 1167 (stating that
private disputes on deceptive use of trade symbols “touch[es] the public welfare,” thus
elucidating the basis prohibiting false advertising).
71. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE U.S.: SECOND FTC SURVEY S-1
(2007) [hereinafter FTC SURVEY].
72. Id.
73. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013).
74. See Tawnya Wojciechowski, Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An Argument for
Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standing for False Advertising Under Lanham Act
Section 43(a), 24 SW. U. L. REV. 213, 232 (1994).
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reasonably.75 After all, these manipulative tactics are illegal in most
states and the real issue is whether consumers have standing to hold
liable the businesses that engage in such practices.76
To determine whether the court correctly decided the standing
issue, it is necessary to review the statutory framework within which
Hinojos’s claim existed. First, California’s UCL prohibits all “unfair
or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s] and unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”77 Specifically in the context
of false sales, California’s FAL provides that “[n]o price shall be
advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the
alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . . within three
months next immediately preceding the publication of the
advertisement . . . .”78
In order to sue for violations of these laws, both the UCL and
FAL adhere to the standing requirements defined in section 17204.79
Section 17204 allows just two avenues to satisfy the standing
requirement.80 Specifically, the complaint must be made by (1) a
government actor “in the name of the people of the State of
California upon their own complaint,” or (2) “by a person who has
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of
the unfair competition.”81 Alleged violations of the UCL or FAL
provide the foundation for redressing unfair competition and false
advertising in California.82 Each statute was heavily referenced in
75. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1105–07.
76. See Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or Deceptive
Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 126 (1987) (stating that the consumer protection movement
flourished in the 1960s, culminating with the enactment of various deceptive trade practices
statutes by the early 1970s).
77. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2013).
78. Id. § 17501.
79. Id. § 17200; id. § 17501.
80. Id. § 17204.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See Arkin, supra note 6, at 157 (“17200 effectuates its protective public policy purpose
by broadly defining unfair competition under what are called ‘the five prongs’: (1) Unlawful
conduct; (2) Unfair conduct; (3) Fraudulent conduct; (4) Deceptive advertising; and (5)
Violations of 17500. Virtually all Unfair Competition Law actions are primarily predicated on
one or more of the first three prongs, i.e., that the conduct is unlawful, unfair or fraudulent.”
(internal citations omitted)); see also Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State
Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010)
(“These statutes are typically very short, broadly prohibiting conduct that is ‘false or deceptive’
and granting private parties very broad standing to sue. Importantly, these statutes often overlap.
California, for example, has both an Unfair Competition Law modeled after the FTC Act and an
Unfair Practices Act that tracks the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”).
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Kwikset and Hinojos.83
Section 17204 was last amended in 2004 following the approval
of Prop. 64 through the California initiative process.84 The campaign
to enact Prop. 64 and its consequences are discussed in greater detail
in Part IV, but for now it is important to note that the amendment to
section 17204 eliminated standing in “the general public” and
allowed standing only to a “person who has suffered injury in fact
and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition.”85 Adding the requirement of “lost money or property”
negated the traditional presumption of emotional injury caused by
fraudulent conduct.86 Amending sections 17200 and 17500 in
accordance with Prop. 64 considerably restricted who had standing to
sue, thereby limiting consumers’ ability to redress false advertising
on multiple levels.87 First, as a result of the statutory restrictions
placed on individuals who fall victim to false advertising, the Prop.
64 amendments to the UCL and FAL compel consumers to rely
heavily on public officials to redress deceptive business practices.88
However, while the law refocused consumer protection efforts
toward public officials, the amendment included no additional
resources or powers to assist those officials in addressing consumer
claims of deception more effectively.89 In fact, “severe budgetary
cut-backs . . . prevent many actions against false advertisers from
being investigated” by the federal and state officials.90 The lack of
government resources to respond to consumer claims, much less to
83. See generally Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
Hinojos did have standing to sue under the UCL and FAL); see generally Kwikset Corp. v.
Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011) (holding that consumers who allege that they were
deceived into purchasing a product due to the misrepresentation of a product’s label have “lost
money or property” as required by California Proposition 64 and have standing to sue under the
UCL and FAL).
84. See infra Part IV.
85. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2013); id. § 17204 (West 2004), amended by
PROP. 64 § 3 (2004).
86. See generally Klass, supra note 4 (discussing the law of deception and how it inherently
punishes parties for their intentional acts).
87. Proposition 64: Limits on Private Enforcement of Unfair Business Competition Laws.
Initiative Statute., CAL. ONLINE VOTER GUIDE (Feb. 10, 2006), http://www.calvoter.org
/voter/elections/2004/props/prop64.html (The official Summary of Prop. 64 states that, if enacted,
the amendments to UCL and FAL “authorize only California Attorney General or local public
officials to sue on behalf of general public to enforce unfair business competition laws.”).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Wojciechowski, supra note 74, at 232.
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actually litigate them, underscores the importance of providing
consumers the ability to seek redress for harms caused by deceptive
business practices themselves.
Moreover, when a consumer’s financial injury from a falsely
stated “sale” price is relatively small, the heightened standing
requirement places another barrier between the consumer and justice.
When the cost of litigation is so great, additional burdens tend to
discourage wronged consumers from suing on their own, causing
them to either suffer a permanent injury or wait for public officials to
take an interest in their case.91
Moreover, section 17204 requires a government actor to bring
the complaint on his own accord.92 Accordingly, unless a consumer
can satisfy the requirement of injury in fact and has sufficient
resources to sue a large retailer like Kohl’s, said consumer must rely
on government attorneys to obtain a remedy.93 Given chronic
understaffing and lack of resources, this path toward relief
substantially limits an individual consumer’s ability to obtain redress
for false advertising and unfair competition.94
Another barrier to consumer standing has been judicial
interpretation of section 17204’s “lost money or property” clause.
Prior to Kwikset, the prevailing judicial interpretation of the
aforementioned clause was that loss needed to be in the form of lost
sales or goodwill.95 This interpretation focused on harm that
competitors suffered due to false advertising, rather than how
commercial deception injured consumers financially and
91. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as a Media for False Advertising, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 327, 339 (2009) (explaining that consumer recovery for false advertising under private
causes of action is unlikely because “consumers rarely have the means and resources to detect
fraud and recover damages” and the high cost of litigation often deters consumer claims); see also
Dale A. Reinholtsen, Role of California’s Attorney General and District Attorneys in Protecting
the Consumer: Substantive Areas of Action, 4 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 35, 37, 54 (1971) (“Harsh
economic realities create numerous practical barriers which confront the consumer when he seeks
to bring a private action.”).
92. CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2013).
93. Id.
94. See Reinholtsen supra note 91 (contending that the paths to relief provided under the
UCL “may be somewhat illusory for many consumers [. . .] when the economic realities of the
marketplace are recognized”); see also Homer Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit
Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 41 (1969) (discussing the obstacles consumers face in pursuing
legal action).
95. See Hall v. Time Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 466, 467, 469, 471–72 (Ct. App. 2008); see also
Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316, 321 (Ct. App. 2008) (explaining the requirements
for standing under section 17204).
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emotionally.96 Since consumers do not have goodwill or sales to lose,
this interpretation left the vast majority of consumers who were not
part of a class action or represented by a government official without
a path for redress.97
Another interpretation of section 17204’s injury requirement
asserted that an injury of lost money or property must “exclude
situations in which a person receives the benefit of the bargain.”98
When the “bargain” is considered mere payment of the stated price
of a good or service, and the “benefit” is retained when the consumer
chooses to purchase based on said price,99 the bar for a consumer not
receiving the benefit of the bargain is impracticably high.100 Such a
narrow interpretation of benefit and bargain essentially meant that a
consumer received “the benefit of the bargain” so long as the seller
did not literally lie to him regarding the price that he expected to
pay—and actually paid—for the product in question. This
interpretation ignores the empirically proven effect that purported
“deals” have on consumers’ decision whether to purchase a product,
as well as the fact that a consumer makes purchasing decisions by
comparing current prices to original prices, not just by evaluating the
bottom-line.101
Moreover, construing “injury” to mean only a tangible financial
loss that is strictly associated with the purchase in question overlooks
the likelihood that a deceived consumer has already incurred—or
would incur—additional transaction costs in the process of rectifying
96. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 883 (Cal. 2011).
97. See Hall, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 470 (“The voters’ intent in passing Proposition 64 and
enacting the changes to the standing rules in Business and Professions Code section 17204 was
unequivocally to narrow the category of persons who could sue business under the UCL.”). See
generally Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff lacked
standing to sue because he had not lost money or property).
98. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing cases in the Ninth Circuit
where a consumer lacked standing when he retained merchandise, even if not of the character for
which the consumer bargained); see also Johnson v. Mitsubishi Digital Elecs. Am. Inc., 365 Fed.
App’x 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If one gets the benefit of the bargain, he has no standing under
the UCL.”); Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. C-09-00927, 2010 WL 94265, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 6, 2010).
99. See Hinojos, 2010 WL 4916647, at *3. The district court followed this presumption,
stating that because Hinojos knew the price he was paying and chose to follow through with the
sale, he received the benefit of the bargain.
100. See id.
101. See Clifford & Rampell, supra note 56; supra Part III.A.
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the deception on his own.102 The possible transaction costs that a
consumer could incur in attempting to rectify the seller’s deception
include return trips to a store or potential loss of value between the
purchase price and the resale value of the product.103 For example, in
the latter scenario, if the consumer attempts to return the product and
thereby loses “the benefit of the bargain,” courts may conclude that
the initial deception was remedied when the consumer returned the
product.104 Such an interpretation would yet again leave consumers
as the victims of false advertising without a means of suing for the
seller’s deception and UCL or FAL violation.
A final interpretation of the standing requirement for consumers
under section 17204 assumed that the plaintiff must be entitled to
restitution.105 However, the Kwikset court observed that this
interpretation conflated a remedies issue with a procedural issue.106
The court noted that this interpretation of Prop. 64 is illogical, for it
prematurely speculates on the merits of a case before deciding
whether the plaintiff even has standing.107
The California Supreme Court considered the variety of
interpretations applied to the “lost money or property” clause of
section 17204, and ultimately landed on the broadest interpretation of
standing where consumer protection statutes were involved.108
Notwithstanding the challenges that Prop. 64 placed on consumers,
the Kwikset court concluded that allowing standing for private
consumers who truthfully allege that a product’s deceptive labeling
102. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 893 (Cal. 2011); see also Meyer v.
Sprint Spectrum L.P., 200 P.3d 295, 299 (Cal. 2009) (discussing how the phrase “any damage” in
the California Civil Code “may encompass harms other than pecuniary damages, such as certain
types of transaction costs”).
103. Cars, for example, lose 10 to 20 percent of their value annually, and even new cars
depreciate by an average of 11 percent within the first minute they are driven off the dealer’s lot.
See Depreciation Infographic: How Fast Does My New Car Lose Value?, EDMUND’S (Sept. 24,
2010), http://www.edmunds.com/car-buying/how-fast-does-my-new-car-lose-value-infographic
.html. Under the benefit-of-the-bargain interpretation, a consumer attempting to remedy deception
encountered when purchasing a new car stands to lose thousands of dollars due to diminished
resale value alone.
104. See Hinojos, No. CV10-07590 ODW (AGRx), 2010 WL 4916647, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 1, 2010), rev’d, 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013).
105. Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 894–95.
106. Id. at 895.
107. See id. at 894–95, for a discussion of Clayworth v. Pfizer Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1087–88
(Cal. 2010), where the California Supreme Court found plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate
“compensable losses or entitlement to restitution” immaterial to the validity of standing under
Section 17204.
108. See id. at 881.
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was material to their decision to purchase is consistent with the
meaning of Prop. 64 and “preserv[es] for actual victims of
deception . . . the ability to sue and enjoin such practices.”109 This
determination paved the way for the even more inclusive view of
standing articulated in Hinojos.
IV. CONSUMER STANDING IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT:
THE CAMPAIGN FOR PROP. 64
As the Hinojos court observed, most consumers have been
motivated to make purchases “because [a] proffered discount seemed
too good to pass up,”110 despite their awareness that retailers “have
an incentive to lie to their customers” about sale prices.111 This
shared experience may well be the reason why the issue of standing
in false advertising and unfair competition cases strikes a chord with
so many consumers.
Also, the long-held right to seek redress for these deceptive
business practices in court was curtailed only recently.112 Until
November 2004, Hinojos’s ability to sue Kohl’s would only have
been limited by his ability to write a well-pleaded complaint.113 This
is because any private consumer had standing under the FAL as a
member of the general public.114 However, as mentioned above, the
requirements for standing changed when voters passed Prop. 64.115
The proponents of Prop. 64 asserted that, by adding a basic
requirement that individual plaintiffs demonstrate an injury-in-fact,
the civil justice system and California businesses could avoid
109. Id.
110. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013); see also FTC SURVEY,
supra note 71 (discussing the various ways consumers are most frequently defrauded).
111. Hinojos, 718 F.3d at 1101.
112. CAL. ONLINE VOTER GUIDE, supra note 87.
113. Prior to the passage of Prop. 64, California Business & Professions Code section 17204
provided that “[a]ctions for relief pursuant to this chapter shall be . . . by a person acting for the
interests of itself, its members or the general public.” CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West
2004). Prop. 64 replaced “acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public” with
“who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition,” thus imposing stricter pleading requirements on consumers. See Roxana Mehrfar,
Redefining Commonality for Consumer Class Actions Under California Business and Professions
Code Sections 17200 and 17500, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 353, 375 (2010) (“[C]omplaints alleging
violations of the UCL fraud prong are subject to the ordinary pleading standard—a short and
plain statement alleging facts upon which relief can be granted.”).
114. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2004) (version prior to amendment due to
Prop. 64’s approval).
115. CAL. ONLINE VOTER GUIDE, supra note 87.
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frivolous “shakedown lawsuits.”116 Proponents of Prop. 64 sought to
end these so-called frivolous lawsuits against businesses, which
“corporate interests . . . long attacked as an invitation for
unscrupulous attorneys to file . . . against businesses.”117 However,
the proponents of Prop. 64 failed to also convey to voters that the
amended law provided no mechanism to weed out frivolous claims
from legitimate ones.118 Thus, while the amendments preserved
prohibitions on deceptive pricing and other unfair business tactics,
they left even the innocent victims (and legitimate claimants) of
consumer fraud unable to obtain redress for clear violations of the
FAL and UCL.
While this consequence of the amendment is clearly misaligned
with the public policy goals of consumer protection,119 in fact it was
the proponents’ goal.120 Ironically, the Prop. 64 proponents’ primary
campaign strategy involved deceiving voters who, like consumers,
rely on advertising and contextual cues to make decisions. The
deception in the “Yes on 64” campaign stemmed largely from the
appearance of support from so-called grassroots organizations called
“Californians Against Lawsuit Abuse” and “Yes on 64—
Californians to Stop Shakedown Lawsuits.”121 These groups were
primarily funded by a wide array of business interests, including
several health insurance and pharmaceutical companies, associations
of car dealers and manufacturers, “Big Tobacco,” and a home
mortgage company that is now defunct as a result of its unscrupulous
116. See Marc Lifsher, Prop. 64 Backers Fight for Attention, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004,
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/01/business/fi-prop641.
117. Marc Lifsher & Myron Levin, Citing Prop. 64, Firms Seek to Kill Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/27/business/fi-prop6427; see PROP. 64, § 1,
SUBD. (C) 1(c) [‘Findings and Declarations of Purpose’] (stating that the purpose of narrowing the
UCL’s standing requirement through the amendment was because of “[f]rivolous unfair
competition lawsuits [that] clog our courts[,] . . . cost taxpayers[,] . . .. and . . . threaten[] the
survival of small businesses”).
118. See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 894 n.21 (Cal. 2011) (“[N]othing
suggests the voters contemplated eliminating statutory standing for consumers actually deceived
by a defendant's representations.”).
119. See supra Part III.A.
120. DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW
§ 2.1 (2013); see also Lifsher & Levin, supra note 117 (stating that the authors of Prop. 64
intended to make “it harder for businesses to be sued over deceptive advertising and other
fraudulent practices under the law”).
121. See Lifsher, supra note 5. See generally Mission and History, CALIFORNIA CITIZENS
AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE (2012), http://www.cala.com/about-cala (explaining the mission of
CALA as a nonpartisan grassroots organization seeking to reduce lawsuit abuse).
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business dealings.122 Yet, proponents’ campaign materials suggest
that their membership is comprised mostly of individuals and small
businesses.123 The United States Chamber of Commerce, the nation’s
largest business association, made the third largest donation and
spent nearly half a million dollars in support of Prop. 64’s passage.124
The Chamber of Commerce was simultaneously involved in
comparable state-level efforts to limit individuals’ standing against
businesses across the country.125
Opponents of Prop. 64 countered that this amendment to the
UCL and FAL would dismantle efforts to protect consumers against
businesses that take advantage of consumers’ information gap.126
The campaign stressed that the amendment “made it harder for
businesses to be sued over deceptive advertising and other fraudulent
practices under the law.”127 Opponents also argued that, while some
private claims may have been frivolous, the great majority of claims
arose from consumers feeling wronged by a business’s deception,
and not consumers playing “jackpot justice” to “shakedown”
business owners.128 Nonetheless, the opponents’ arguments were
drowned out by the far better financed campaign in support of Prop.
64.129
122. FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 2 (featuring a table of the proponents top twenty
contributors). Countrywide Home Loans donated $200,000 to the “Yes on 64” campaign in 2004,
when it was the largest mortgage lender in the United States. Id. By 2009, Countrywide had gone
under and its officers were under investigation for civil and criminal fraud charges. Press Release,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever
Financial Penalty Against Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010) (on file with Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n).
123. CALIFORNIA CITIZENS AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE, supra note 121.
124. FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 2 (listing a donation by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce to Yes on 64: Californians to Stop Shakedown Lawsuits for $495,000).
125. See HOT COFFEE, supra note 54.
126. Richard Holober, An Opposing View: Prop. 64, SFGATE, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www
.sfgate.com/default/article/AN-OPPOSING-VIEW-PROP-64-Protect-consumers-2678773.php.
127. See ARKIN, supra note 6, at 156 (discussing the Prop. 64 campaign’s emphasis on
frivolous and extortive lawsuits); see also Lifsher & Levin, supra note 117 (stating that “[t]he
ballot measure made it harder for businesses to be sued over deceptive advertising and other
fraudulent practices under the law”).
128. Id.
129. FOLLOW THE MONEY, supra note 2 (stating that the proponents, led by “Yes on 64,”
raised $20,551,881. The top three contributors made the following campaign contributions to
“Yes on 64”: California Motor Car Dealers Association—$5,251,072; Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers California—$1,500,000; US Chamber of Commerce. The opponents of Prop. 64
received $3,206,391 in donation—its largest from Consumer Attorneys of California in the
amount of $763,700.); see also Eric Lipton, Mike McIntire & Don Van Natta, Jr., Top
Corporations Aid U.S. Chamber of Commerce Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22 2010, at A1.
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After outspending the opponents of Prop. 64 by more than six to
one,130 the “Yes on 64” campaign helped Prop. 64 pass with 59
percent of the vote.131 Until Hinojos, Prop. 64 effectively shut
courthouse doors to the vast majority of consumers, including those
who were demonstrably injured by a business’ illegal, deceptive
practices.
V. COMPARING CALIFORNIA’S STANDING
REQUIREMENTS TO THE FEDERAL STANDARD
AND OTHER STATES’
State false advertising laws are important to consumers because
the federal prohibition on false advertising, found in the Lanham
Act,132 only permits standing for business competitors.133 While the
Lanham Act undoubtedly benefits consumers by imposing some
degree of accountability on businesses and encouraging honesty in
the marketplace, the total lack of standing for private individuals
forces consumers to rely entirely on state law remedies.134
Through the experience of Prop. 64’s initial interpretation,
which is echoed at the state level around the country,135 consumers
are at a serious disadvantage in the fight against false advertising. In
Alabama, for example, the test for a private individual’s right of
action under the state’s false advertising statute is a showing that the
plaintiff “suffered any monetary damage as a result of . . .
‘unconscionable, false, misleading or deceptive act or practice in the
conduct of trade . . . .’”136 New York’s deceptive business statute
130. Id.
131. California General Election: State Ballot Measures, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
http://vote2004.sos.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2004).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
133. See Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)
(“Congress’s purpose in enacting § 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair competition
remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers generally and almost certainly
without any consideration of consumer rights of action in particular.”); see In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Brian Morris, Consumer
Standing to Sue for False and Misleading Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act, 17 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 427 (1987) (describing the Second Circuit’s holding
in Colligan that consumers lack standing under the Lanham Act).
134. BeVier, supra note 16, at 16; see Tushnet, supra note 54, at 1375.
135. See generally Carter, supra note 17 (summarizing the discrepancies in the various fifty
states’ Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices statutes that protect consumers from unfair
business practices).
136. Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (2002); Billions v. White &
Stafford Furniture Co., 528 So. 2d 878, 880 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
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mirrors California’s, providing that an individual person may bring
suit for “deceptive practices in the conduct of business” only if that
person has suffered financial injury as a result of the deception.137
State statutes such as these, which severely restrict consumers’
standing, are not anomalous. Rather, in addition to the examples
listed above, sixteen other states have statutes that are roughly
comparable to California’s UCL138 and likewise include California’s
high bar for establishing consumer standing.139 The status of state
false advertising and unfair competition statutes thus underscores
how unique the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of California law was
in Hinojos.
VI. CONCLUSION
The broader implication of the Hinojos holding is a rollback on
a movement by business interests to limit their liability for false
advertising. The campaign for Prop. 64 and other legal efforts to
limit the scope of consumer protection laws have significantly
obstructed consumer access to the civil justice system over the last
two decades,140 and—as feared by its opponents—Prop. 64 has had a
“devastating impact on innocent” Californians.141 Yet, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Hinojos may signal a wind shift in the arena of
private individual standing for unfair business practices claims.
Given the materiality standard announced in Kwikset and
affirmed for false sales in Hinojos, when Hinojos’s case returns to
district court on remand, Hinojos has a strong chance of obtaining
relief against Kohl’s. To achieve this result, Hinojos must effectively
137. Consumer Protection Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 1984).
138. Robert C. Fellmeth, California’s Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and Confusions,
Unfair Competition Litigation, 26 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 191, 239 (1996).
139. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2012);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-2 (2013); 121 1/2 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 262 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 51 § 1405 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207
(2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103
(West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1602 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2013); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-5-20 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-2.5 (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2453 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 2013); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 100.20
(West 2013).
140. See HOT COFFEE, supra note 54; see also CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, supra note
4 (stating that as a result of CALAs, “statistics reflect juries’ increasingly antagonistic attitude
toward injured plaintiffs”).
141. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Vetoing Product Liability Legislation and an
Exchange With Reporters (May 2, 1996) (transcript available via The American Presidency
Project).
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convey that his decision to purchase items at Kohl’s was based on a
belief that Kohl’s apparent price reductions presented a deal too good
to pass up.
In sum, despite the fears of California business interests that
Hinojos opens the floodgates to frivolous lawsuits,142 the decision is,
in fact, in accord with California voters’ belief that Prop. 64 protects
businesses from frivolous claims while retaining actual victims’
ability to pursue legitimate claims.
The balance of legislative intent, consumer protection policy,
and traditional understandings of what constitutes injury, as applied
in Hinojos, represents a sensible approach to the application of false
advertising laws that ought to be reflected at the federal level as well.
Although Hinojos is limited to California, the Ninth Circuit’s
approach should put the other states in the circuit on notice as to the
Ninth Circuit’s likely interpretation of the standing requirement in
connection with other unfair competition laws. Hopefully, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision is the first of many judicial and legislative actions
to acknowledge the value of standing for private consumer actions
when deceptive business practices are in play.

142. See Press Release, Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, ‘The Next Big Thing’ in Litigation Abuse,
ATRA Cites Exploitation of State Consumer Protection Acts a Growing Concern (July 13, 2006),
available at http://www.atra.org/newsroom/next-big-thing-litigation-abuse; see also Lifsher &
Levin, supra note 117 (discussing Prop. 64’s alleged main purpose of ridding the California legal
system of “shakedown lawsuits” that allegedly only benefitted unscrupulous lawyers).

